lich's contention that anirrals experience
pain but do not suffer.
But dead anirrals,
those being killed humanely (theoretically),
and those killed a manent ago and therefore
not existing as live anirrals do not experi

()piniQn

ence pain and do not suffer, at least in this
world of which we have sane knowledge.
But,
for me, it has always been evident that being
killed is the rrost intense form of p3.in or
suffering even though death itself is not
felt.
To expose an anirral to suffering or
cruelty and then to kill it is to doubly
a:rnpound the rroral rralfeasance.
I am no
spiritualist, but my irragination has long
autanatically insisted that the full quantum
of death' s pain-equivalence is scm:mow irrmed.
iately rranifest just the other side of the
boundary between life and death.
The crime
of killing is great, though no voice be
heard.

John Stockwell
The Schweitzer Center

It rray well be possible to develop ani
rrals, or provide situations for anirrals,
which are pain-free, and to yet have it be
the case that such developnent and the making
of such situations are imroral acts and the
implicated anirrals exploited.

Is it conceivable that to cause pain or
suffering is rrorally wrong but that to kill
is not?
Perhaps it is also rrorally wrong to
kill humans, rrorally considerable beings, but
only wrong to cause animals to suffer cruel
ly?

In his critical notice of R. G. Frey's
Rights, Killing and Suffering:
Horal Vege
tarianism and Applied Ethics, in these p3.ges,
James Nelson cites Frey's use in his book of
James Rachels' distinction between "being
alive" and "having a life." Nelson ccmnents
that Frey's use of this distinction brings to
mind Regan's notion of a "subject of a life."
According to Nelson, Frey in his book favors
the "concerned individual" approach to issues
of factory fanning Oller the "rroral vegetari
an" approach.
Concerned individuals, Frey
holds, work to imprOlle conditions on factory
fanns, lessening the suffering of fann ani
mals by diverting resources "into the devel
opnent of new and relatively painless methods
of breeding, feeding, and killing anirrals. of

I t seems to me that part of the diffi
culty rrany have in assigning rroral wrong to
killing anirrals must rest in the difficulty
of conceiving of any experience at all in
life which has just in the manent ceased to
be living.
That which does not exist cannot
either suffer or hurt and cannot be the ob
ject of rroral action.
By killing, in the
case of anirrals, actions are substantially
freed of rroral relevance. Certainly the idea
of humane slaughter rests at least in part
upon a difference in the value placed upon
pain-free life in a:rnparison with non-exist
ence.
I find myself wanting to speak of the
"pain of non-existence."
.

new pain-preventing and pain-killing drugs, of
new types of tranquilizers and sedatives,
etc." and "seek further appropriate break
throughs in genetic engineering."

Can it be that sane of the contell1POrary
resistance to holding that killing anirrals is
rrorally wrong originates in the anti-reli
gious?
Being that the injunction not to
kill, which can be extended to refer also to
anirrals, is taken to be a rroral/religious
injunction vouched for by Moses' rep..1ted
experience of God?

'IWo considerations in Peter Singer's
Animal Liberation bothered me. The first was

his drawing of the line for equal considera
tion of species' interests just "above" the
rrollusc.
The other, and it is this point
that. is brought freshly to mind by Nelson's
review, was his decision to give less consi
deration to the question of killing anirrals
than to that of their suffering.
It seemed
to me that this tactic clearly related to his
insistence that rroral change is to be effec
ted first by rational argument in preference
to any affective approach. . Those who rray
have read my "Opinion" piece in BTS #2 will
perhaps remember my remarks
Ivan Il

Whatever rray be the true relationship of
these rratters, we should continue, I think,
to be very wary of rroral systems which do not
also prohibit the killing of anirrals.
The
killing of anirrals is in itself a rroral
wrong.
In addition,
schemes to get around

about

105

BE:IWEEN THE SPECIES

the

-

-

irnrrorality of the act by providing

ani

in which the occupant is "ontained more and
more indoors, more and lIDre in the absence of
soil, vegetation and animal life, lIDre and
more connected to a high-tech "life support
systerr." whose plug at some point may be
pulled by the prograrrmers of politics or
economics.
It is insane to justify explora
tions which likely will be, and are being,
used against human freedom.
.And it is iln
moral to advance the confinement, or adjust
ment to confinement, of animals.
This con
nection is a principal reason why the desti
nies of animals and hwnan persons are now so
substantially intertwined.

mals with pain-free lives to the p:>int of
death must be resisted.
"Pain-free unto
death" gives the sense of it.
When anilTh.'l.ls
are deprived of the ordinary pains of their
natura:' lives, that is a cruelty.
Further
more, the destruction of an animal' s capacity
to feel pain and/or the suppression of the
behaviors that in animals express pain, so
that the animal, it ~nay be claimed, is not in
pain when in reality it is experiencing in
tense pain, are not lIDral, no matter what the
calculus applied to whatever. pain/pleasure
quotient is rranifest only in the circum
scribed lIDffient.

IS THE MERELY PAIN- FREE LIFE
I have been surprised by Evelyn Pluhar's
suggestion in "On the Genetic Manipulation of
Animals" (BTS, vol. 1, no. 3) that the chance
that the new biotechnological techniques will
be abused is "exceedingly slim."
I think
Pluhar is too sanguine in this opinion.· Ivan
Illich, in Medical Nemesis, documents exten
sive abuse through practices so taken for
granted that their employment does not even
depend up:m any clear point of lIDral choice
such that discussions by philosophers would
likely arise or have much impact up:m any
course being followed.

(MORALLY CONSIDERABLE,
NEVERTHELESS)

The capacity of society and its medicine
suppress the expressions (Darwin) of pain
and to suppress pain itself is already far
advanced.
If there is no felt pain, but the
tissue Qr physiological functioning of the
animal is damaged nevertheless, then if by
,- means of the suppression of pain or suppres
sion of pain's expression the animal is able
to be held in a way which overcomes any I!IOral
objection based on cruelty, but is thereby
led to death, that is an irrunoral act.
This
is why we need not only I!IOral philosophy but
lIDral philosophy and science to work out the
exchanges (as Susan Isen puts it in "Beyond
Abolition: Ethical Exchanges with Animals in
Agriculture," BTS, vol. 1., no. 4) in a world
governed by an ethic that asserts that it is
wrong to kill animals. Such a wodd is envi
sioned by George Abbe in Negavit.
to

A LIFE WORTH LIVING?

When the integrity of animals I natural
ways of living remain intact, then those
animals "have a life." They are the "subject
of a life." They are "life-that-wills-to
live in the midst of life-that-wills-to-live"
(Schweitzer), a formulation not easily im
proved upon. This does not mean that finally
a I!IOrally relevant distinction can success
fully be drawn between "being alive" and
"having a life." If confined and pain-sup
pressed animals, whose natural ways are not
intact, no longer "have a life" but are
alive, nevertheless, then their killing re
mains irnlIDral, perhaps even particularly so,
since one evil is compounded (not brought to
an end) by another.

Animals and humanity must find cornlIDn
cause.
The means whereby humanity confines
and restricts its own members are developed
and perfected in research into the confine
ment of non-human species.
Parallel psycho
logical and propaganda techniques ir:mre the
hwnan person to his/her restricted situation

These considerations are not to be un
derstood in a way that aligns them with any
religious, social scientific, legal, or psy-

at work and in an increasing assortment of
life situations, including the house and yard
BE'IWEEN THE SPECIES
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chiatric insistence upon the preservation/ex
tension of life at all costs (particularly to
the plblic treasury and clients?).
Death is
llOre acceptable than that.
Death is neither
to be hurried on its way nor grotesquely
forestalled.
But the acceptability of death
is not ither to be understood in a way that
conspires with sane new technology of
ying
and grief or ligns acceptance of death With
indifference toward one's own
ving of a
ilie or toNard the lives of others.

to yourself.
No matb>..r that
e ostensible
goal of new developnents in animal husbandry
is, through focx1, to provi e for the well
being of humanity, the rts of confinEmmt
come to have wider g:>lication.
This is not
to say auything againb-t what has since Kohr
and Schumacher become known as human scale in
living or as voluntary simplicity, for these
are genuine and ecological ideals.
But the
technology of the ("estriction of the organism
has nothing in COIlIIDI1 with such true ideals.
Nor, really, does the answer to the classic
Buddhist questi00 concerning hO'N' the fish in

Herding native peoples onto reservdtions
or "hernelands," cattle into fee:llots, trees
and shrubbery into "landscaped" plazas ar
all ctions that cleitr the terrain. Into th
clearings spcead houses,
streets, cafes,
gasoline stations, silicoll chip f ctories,
video arcade, and other structures
1 conJ.TW1g
rc:wing human population.
'!he
process goes on also at the ex nse of c~p
land, already a d~splacemen leading to ces
tricted woodland and other natural habitat.
Fairly hr long, sane national parks, open
space, a bit of faonland, some reservations
will remain.
At that point, and we are suf
ficiently close to that p:U.nt now to discern
the trends, these uses and this "setting
asi e" which is also a ruling out, will be
seen even llOre clearly than t present to
have accomplished an enclosure, an entrapnent
of humanity.
At the individual level or at
the level of the family, thi entrapnent is
alreatly far alo~: people cut off from coun
tryside, fresh air, and clean water, kids and
companion animal contained by dangerous city
streets, 1e outside nO'N' so impoverished that
the cnvirorurent has bec:aiE very substanti lly
inside.
Accanpanying the self-entrapnent of
humanity is the extinction of species, except
for genetically engineered life forms adjus
ted to the restricted space and possibility
of living-and even these only in th interim
before space canp].etely disappears.

the

'"11"1er,=,

bottle is to be freed:

it

is

free, " suggesting thdt freedem is wholly
inner in nature. We know that while there is
meaning in thp. idea of inner freedem, and
know that it is possible to have an inflated
notion of what is reqllired to be free, such
llEaning as there is in the ideii of inner
freedom does not makp. it good to have irnpri
soned Gandhi, Aurobindo, or Thoreau. Simi
larly, there is no virtue at aU in the
confinement of animals.
Nothing gocx1 has or
will c.:orne of it, though the consequences in
the lives of animals and human persons be

"f)'linless. "

ANIMALS.

Do they matter?
An exl"itinl{ n ... w awar... n

'I'

unfuhlln~ alul1Il

our rl'latlfm,hll'
"II II alII mal-. ,Inel I hI" n"t of I h,'
nJlllr;11 ""rlol 1~I';1I1 ;111"'11 II :11
THE A!\J:'otALS' AGE!':DA.

TilE ANJ~tALS' AGE:"DA j{1\ ,"
1'1111 nl'w,. \ iI'''' an,l 3nh ii"

~lwllil anllll:ol rij.:III', ""'lfan' allol

;llld aINII.11 I h" 1"'''1'1..
"h" ,In' lIlaklllll all,m,11 nght, ."",
IIf lit,' 1Il.II"r 1""'''' lIe ! hI' '~Il',
A \\'lIll1.E :llll\'~:,\l E, 'T "k't"
1\ II ~: 1.·\(;AZl:\E
'~''''-'''L'''
.-.---____
AGE.""D..\

]

I'n'II'IIIIIIl.

r:::-

_'!...!..'"


I

- YE
'-'

Just as those I ew Age spiritual and
Ilumanistic psychological ~thods of the 60's
and 70 I s that were designed to free and make
whole the human person have been significant
ly co-opted by consultants to corpor tians
arrl employed in an attenpt to enhance the
capacity of managerial groLlps to control the
\-'Orkplace, so will and does the developnent
of means of growth facilitation, disease
control, and painlessness for the I ives of
animals in confined spaces auger the pplica
tion of serne of these and other similar me
thods to humanity itself.
Do not do unto
thars tha t which you would not have be done
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